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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
 
This court has jurisdiction under section 509(b)(1)(F) of the 
Clean Water Act (“CWA”), 33 U.S.C. § 1369(b)(1)(F) (2012), to 
review the final federal National Pollutant Discharge Elimination 
System (“NPDES”) permit issued to EnerProg, L.L.C. (“EnerProg”) 
for discharges associated with the continued operation of the 
Moutard Electric Generating Station (“MEGS”) located in Fossil, 
Progress. On April 1, 2017, pursuant to 40 C.F.R. § 124.19(a) 
(2017), Petitioners EnerProg and Fossil Creek Watchers, Inc., 
(“FCW”) timely filed for review of the permit with the 
Environmental Appeals Board (“EAB”) of the United States 
Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”). Record (“R.”) at 6. After 
the EAB issued an order denying review, EnerProg and FCW 
timely petitioned this Court for review. Id. 2. 
 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
 
I. Is the EPA required to include conditions requiring closure 
and remediation of the ash pond as provided by the State of 
Progress in the CWA section 401 certification without 
regard to their consistency with section 401(d) of the CWA? 
And if so, do the conditions constitute appropriate 
requirements of state law as required by section 401(d)? 
 
II. Does the April 25, 2017, EPA temporary stay notice 
effectively require the postponement of certain compliance 
deadlines for the 2015 Final Effluent Limitation Guidelines 
for the Steam Electric Power Generating Industry, given 
that EPA reasonably concluded under section 705 of the 
Administrative Procedure Act that justice so requires the 
postponement of the deadlines in light of pending judicial 
review in the Fifth Circuit? 
 
III. Under section 402 of the CWA, did EPA Region XII properly 
determine it could rely on Best Professional Judgment to 
require zero discharge of coal ash transport wastes given 
that EnerProg’s MEGS is subject to properly promulgated 
2https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelroc/vol9/iss1/4
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Steam Electric Power Generating Point Source Category 
Effluent Limitation Guidelines? 
 
IV. Does the MEGS ash pond treatment system classify as a 
“waste treatment system” under 40 C.F.R. § 122.2, given 
the legal effect of Note 1, thereby excluding it from the 
jurisdictional reach of the CWA and NPDES permitting 
requirements for internal Outfall 008 and Outfall 009? 
 
V. Does dewatering and capping the MEGS ash pond trigger 
section 404 of the CWA requiring EnerProg to obtain a fill 
permit when fill material is not being placed into a water of 
the United States? 
 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
 
On April 1, 2017, EnerProg and FCW petitioned EAB for 
review of the NPDES Permit No. PG000123 (“NPDES Permit”), 
requesting on numerous grounds that the permit be remanded to 
EPA Region XII for further consideration. R. at 6. Both petitions 
were timely filed in accordance with EAB’s filing deadline 
extension. Id. On January 18, 2017, EPA Region XII issued the 
NPDES Permit to EnerProg. Id. at 6. The NPDES Permit 
authorizes EnerProg to continue water pollution discharges 
associated with the continued operation of the MEGS. Id. 
EnerProg objected to the permits’s inclusion of conditions set 
in the CWA section 401 certification issued by the State of 
Progress. Id. at 2. Further, EnerProg objected to the November 1, 
2018, deadlines for compliance with zero discharge requirements 
for coal ash transport waters as contemplated by a notice issued by 
EPA Administrator Scott Pruitt on April 25, 2017 (“Temporary 
Stay Notice”). Id. Lastly, EnerProg challenged the permit writer’s 
reliance on Best Professional Judgment (“BPJ”) as a ground for 
requiring implementation of dry handling of bottom ash and fly ash 
wastes to achieve the zero discharge requirements. Id. On the 
other hand, the FCW argued that internal discharges of fly ash and 
bottom ash from Outfall 008 into the MEGS coal ash pond 
treatment system (“MEGS Pond”) required an NPDES permit. 
3
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FCW also asserted that the closure and capping required a section 
404 permit. Id. at 12–13. 
The EAB, in affirming the issuance of the NPDES Permit to 
EnerProg, subsequently denied EnerProg’s and FCW’s petition for 
review and all of the arguments raised. Id. at 2, 10–13. EnerProg 
and FCW then timely petitioned this Court for judicial review of 
the final decision of the EAB. Id. at 2. 
 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
 
The MEGS is a coal-fired steam electric power plant located in 
Fossil, Progress. Id. at 6. Because it is a steam electric power 
generating point source, MEGS is subject to EPA’s effluent 
limitation guidelines (“ELGs”). Id. at 9. MEGS utilizes water 
resources from Moutard Reservoir to operate its facility, mainly to 
operate the closed-cycle cooling system. Id. at 7. Water is also 
withdrawn from the Moutard Reservoir to make up for evaporative 
losses from the cooling tower, for boiler water, and to transport fly 
ash and bottom ash. Id. 
To remove ash build up, MEGS maintains a wet fly ash and 
bottom ash handling and waste treatment system in order to 
remove coal by-products that build up in the plant’s boiler and 
furnace systems during steam generation. To remove the coal ash, 
MEGS sluices the coal combustion residuals through water pipes, 
discharging the fly ash and bottom ash transport water into the 
MEGS Pond via Internal Outfall 008. Id. There the transport 
water undergoes treatment by sedimentation before being 
discharged to the Moutard Reservoir via Outfall 002. Id. The 
MEGS Pond was created in June 1978 by damming the then free-
flowing upper reach of Fossil Creek, which does not discharge to 
the reservoir, but is a perennial tributary to the Progress River, a 
navigable-in-fact interstate body of water. Id. 
In response to Progress’ Clean Air Act Implementation Plan, 
EnerProg installed a Flue Gas Desulfurization (“FGD”) system. Id. 
The FGD blowdown generates a flow of approximately 125 million 
gallons of water per day and was designed to discharge into the 
MEGS Pond via Outfall 009. Id. However, in February 2015 
EnerProg installed a vapor compression evaporator (“VCE”) to 
treat the FGD blowdown. The VCE evaporates the majority of the 
4https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelroc/vol9/iss1/4
  
2018] RUNNER UP – BEST BRIEF 109 
 
water waste produced from the FGD, typically eliminating the 
majority of waste water blowdown from the FGD that discharges 
into the MEGS Pond via Outfall 009. Id. The MEGS plant converts 
the rest of the waste stream for use in other MEGS processes. Id. 
Currently, MEGS is also constructing a new FGD settling basin. 
Id. at 10. The waste from the basin will be treated by VCE. Id. In 
case of the severe storms, overflow from the basin may be routed 
to Outfall 002. Id. 
The facility operates five outfalls. Id. Outfall 001 is a cooling 
tower system that directly discharges to Moutard Reservoir. Id. 
Outfall 002 is an ash pond treatment system that also discharges 
directly to Moutard Reservoir. Id. at 7–8. Internal Outfall 008 is a 
fly ash and bottom ash transport water system which discharges 
directly to the MEGS Pond. Id. at 8. Internal Outfall 009 is the 
discharge from the FGD blowdown treatment system to the MEGS 
Pond. Id. Lastly, Outfall 002A will contain the discharge from the 
new lined retention basin, upon completion of construction. Id. at 
8. 
To continue operation of the MEGS, EnerProg applied for a 
renewal of its NPDES Permit. Id. at 7. As a condition for state 
certification under section 401 of CWA, the State of Progress 
requires EnerProg to comply with the Progress Coal Ash Cleanup 
Act (“CACA”)—a state law purported to prevent the hazards 
associated with the failures of ash treatment pond containment 
systems. The law requires the “assessment, closure, and 
remediation of substandard coal ash disposal facilities in the State 
of Progress.” Id. at 8–9. To comply with CACA, EnerProg must: (1) 
terminate use of the MEGS Pond by November 1, 2018, (2) dewater 
the ash pond by September 1, 2019, and (3) cap the remaining coal 
combustion residuals by September 1, 2020. Id. As a result, the 
MEGS will be required to build a new retention basin to reroute all 
waste streams currently discharged into the MEGS Pond. Id. at 9. 
Upon completion, the new lined retention basin will receive MEGS 
wastewater discharge via Outfall 002A. Id. at 8. 
Pursuant to the 2015 revised ELGs for the Steam Electric 
Power Generating Point Source Category (“2015 ELGs Rule”), Best 
Available Technology (“BAT”) for toxic discharges associated with 
bottom ash and fly ash is zero discharge, based on the available 
technology of dry handling of these wastes. Id. at 9. The discharge 
5
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from the MEGS Pond contains elevated levels of arsenic, mercury, 
and selenium. It was therefore determined by the permit writer 
that independent of the 2015 ELGs Rule, the NPDES Permit must 
contain limits for toxic pollutants present in the discharge. Id. 
Accordingly, the permit writer—using his BPJ—determined that 
zero discharge of ash handling wastes by November 1, 2018, 
constitutes BAT for discharges associated with coal ash wastes. Id. 
The permit writer reasoned that dry handling of bottom ash and 
fly ash has been in use in the industry and that the MEGS is 
sufficiently profitable to adopt the dry handling of these wastes 
with no more than a twelve cents per month increase in the 
average consumer’s electric bill. Id. 
 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 
Challenges to EPA actions under section 509(b) of the CWA, 
33 U.S.C. § 1369(b), are reviewed under the extremely deferential 
arbitrary and capricious standard. See Akiak Native Cmty. v. EPA, 
625 F.3d 1162, 1165 (9th Cir. 2010). Under the APA a court must 
set aside agency action only if it is “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse 
of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.” 5 U.S.C. 
§ 706(2)(A) (2012). Review under this standard “is narrow and a 
court is not to substitute its judgment for that of the agency.” Motor 
Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 
43 (1983). Agency action is arbitrary and capricious only where an 
agency has “entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the 
problem, offered an explanation for its decision that runs counter 
to the evidence . . . , or is so implausible that it could not be 
ascribed to a difference in view or the product of agency expertise.” 
Id. 
 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
 
EnerProg takes issue with the final NPDES Permit as issued 
by EPA Region XII and affirmed by the EAB. First, EnerProg takes 
issue with the NPDES Permit’s inclusion of certain requirements 
for the closure of its MEGS Pond mandated by the State of Progress 
as conditions to the state certification under section 401(d), 33 
U.S.C. § 1341(d) (2012). EPA is required to include in an NPDES 
6https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelroc/vol9/iss1/4
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permit only those conditions which are consistent with the CWA. 
Here, the coal ash pond closure and remediation conditions set by 
the State of Progress are not appropriate requirements of state law 
and are outside of the scope of section 401(d), 33 U.S.C. §1341(d), 
because they are not based on achieving state water quality 
standards established under section 303 of the CWA, 33 U.S.C. 
§ 1313 (2012). 
Second, EnerProg takes issue with the EAB’s refusal to 
postpone the NPDES Permit’s November 1, 2018, compliance 
deadlines for achieving zero discharge of coal ash transport waters 
as contemplated by the April 25, 2017, Temporary Stay Notice. The 
Temporary Stay Notice issued by EPA pursuant to section 705 of 
the APA, effectively postpones the November 1, 2018, deadlines for 
achieving zero discharge of coal ash transport waters for the 2015 
ELGs Rule because it comports with the APA. EPA reasonably 
concluded that: (1) justice so requires the postponement of the 
compliance deadlines in light of pending judicial review in the Fifth 
Circuit; (2) compliance deadlines that have not passed are within 
the meaning of “effective date”; and (3) section 705 temporary stays 
do not require notice and comment rulemaking. 
Lastly, EnerProg takes issue with EPA Region XII’s reliance 
on BPJ for requiring zero discharge of coal ash transport waters by 
November 1, 2018, because the CWA does not require BPJ 
determinations where a nationwide ELG applies. The 2015 ELGs 
Rule has the full force and effect of law and thus reliance on BPJ 
has a negative practical effect on EnerProg’s NPDES Permit 
requirements. Even if the 2015 ELGs Rule was eliminated or 
vacated, reliance on BPJ is still improper since the 1982 ELGs 
regulate arsenic, mercury, and selenium. Assuming BPJ applies, 
EPA Region XII failed to consider if BAT effluent limitations was 
economically achievable. 
 On the other hand, EPA Region XII and the EAB properly 
determined that no effluent limitations are required for Internal 
Outfall 008 as it does not discharge into a “water of the United 
States.” The MEGS Pond is not a “water of the United States,” as 
that term is defined in 40 C.F.R. § 122.2 (2017), because it is a 
waste treatment system and is therefore not subject to NPDES 
permitting requirements. Although the exclusion was initially 
limited to only manmade bodies of water which were neither 
7
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originally created in waters of the United States nor resulted from 
impoundment of waters of the United States, the EPA properly 
suspended the qualifying sentence of the exclusion. 
Additionally, EPA Region XII and the EAB properly 
determined that the coal ash pond closure and capping plan does 
not require a permit under section 404 of the CWA, 33 U.S.C. 
§ 1344 (2012). The jurisdictional definition of “waters of the United 
States” is almost identical for section 402 and section 404 
permitting. Under both the EPA’s and the Army Corps of 
Engineers’ regulations for administering the section 404 program, 
the coal ash pond is not a “water of the United States,” and an 
exemption for waste treatment systems apply. However, even if the 
MEGS Pond is found to be a “water of the United States,” EPA is 
not the proper agency to issue a section 404 permit as the Secretary 
of the Army is tasked with that responsibility. 
 
ARGUMENT 
 
I. THE FINAL NPDES PERMIT IMPROPERLY 
INCLUDED CONDITIONS SET BY THE STATE 
OF PROGRESS IN THE CWA SECTION 401 
CERTIFICATION. 
 
Section 401(a)(1) of the CWA, 33 U.S.C. §1341(a)(1), requires 
an applicant for a federal license or permit, whose activity may 
result in a discharge into navigable waters, to obtain a certification 
from the state in which the discharge originates. The purpose of 
the certification is to ensure that the applicant’s discharge 
complies with sections 301, 302, 303, 306, and 307, which congress 
enumerated in section 401(a). See 33 U.S.C. § 1341(a). Conditions 
included by the state in the certificate become conditions on the 
federal license or permit, so long as they are “necessary to assure” 
compliance with limitations enumerated in the code and with “any 
other appropriate requirement of State law.” Id. § 1341(d) 
(emphasis added). This Court reviews EPA’s action under the 
arbitrary and capricious standard. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A); Am. 
Wildlands v. Browner, 260 F.3d 1192, 1196 (10th Cir. 2011). 
 
8https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelroc/vol9/iss1/4
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A. The EPA Must Verify That the Conditions Set by the 
State of Progress for EnerProg to Obtain 
Certification are Consistent With CWA Section 
401(d) Before Those Conditions are Incorporated in 
an NPDES Permit. 
 
The EPA is Congressionally authorized to administer the 
CWA. Am. Rivers, Inc. v. FERC., 129 F.3d 99, 107 (2d Cir. 1997). 
Furthermore, several courts have ruled that the EPA has the 
discretion to review state water standards to verify they comply 
with the CWA. Defs. of Wildlife v. EPA, 415 F.3d 1121, 1127 (10th 
Cir. 2005) (holding that the EPA correctly found ambiguous state 
regulation adopted under state’s water quality act did not apply, 
and that the regulation was contrary to the CWA); Nw. Envtl. 
Advocates v. EPA, 855 F. Supp. 2d 1199, 1211 (D. Or. 2012) (noting 
that the EPA had a duty to review the State of Oregon’s water 
quality standards to verify it met CWA’s requirements); Nat. Res. 
Def. Council v. EPA, 806 F. Supp. 1263, 1273 (E.D. Va. 1992) 
(holding the EPA sufficiently reviewed state standards under 
statutory scheme of the CWA). Agency decisions should not be 
disturbed or substituted by judges who, unlike agency 
administrators, have no duty or expertise with regard to the 
statute. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 
U.S. 837, 843–45 (1984). 
Here, the EAB mistakenly cited Am. Rivers, Inc. in proposing 
that the EPA does not have the authority to review the certification 
requirements set by the State of Progress. See Am. Rivers, Inc., 129 
F.3d at 107. However, the court in Am. Rivers, Inc. only held that 
the Federal Energy Regulation Commission (“FERC”) does not 
have the discretion to review a state’s certification requirements. 
Id. (“[T]he [FERC] is not Congressionally authorized to administer 
the CWA . . .‘[e]xcept as otherwise expressly provided in this 
chapter, the Administrator of the [EPA] shall administer this 
chapter.’”). 
Moreover, the laws of Progress do not provide for review of 
such certifications in the state’s courts. Because there is no 
procedure available under the laws of Progress for EnerProg to 
obtain judicial review of the state certification conditions, 
EnerProg would be substantially prejudiced. Cf. 40 C.F.R. 
9
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§ 124.55(e) (2017). Allowing review where a court does not have 
procedures available would lead to efficiency in the judicial system, 
certainty, and fairness. 
 
B. The Ash Pond Closure and Remediation Conditions 
are Not “Appropriate Requirements of State Law” as 
Required by Section 401(d) of The CWA Because the 
CACA Requirements are Not Based on Achieving 
State Water Quality Standards Established Under 
CWA Section 303. 
 
Although section 401(d) of the CWA, 33 U.S.C. § 1341(d), 
authorizes the state to place restrictions on a permit applicant’s 
activity, that authority is limited. PUD No. 1 of Jefferson Cty. v. 
Washington Dep’t of Ecology, 511 U.S. 700, 712, (1994). The state 
can only certify that the project conforms with limitations 
prescribed in the CWA. Id. One such limitation is prescribed in 
section 303 of the CWA, 33 U.S.C. § 1313 (2012). See 33 U.S.C. 
§ 1341(a), (d) (limitation is incorporated into section 401(d) because 
it is expressly enumerated in section 401(a)). Accordingly, states 
may condition an applicant’s section 401(d) certification on their 
compliance with section 303. 
Section 303 grants states the authority, subject to federal 
approval, to establish water quality standards for all intrastate 
waters. PUD No. 1 of Jefferson Cty., 511 U.S. at 700. Section 303(c) 
defines “water quality standard” as: (1) “the designated uses of the 
navigable waters involved,” and (2) “the water quality criteria for 
such waters based upon such uses.” 33 U.S.C. § 1313(c)(2)(A). 
Here, the EAB erred when it affirmed the certification 
conditions set by the State of Progress because the coal ash pond 
remediation and closure requirements pursuant to CACA are 
outside the scope of section 303. The authority of the State of 
Progress under section 401 is limited to the extent the permit 
complies with water quality standards under section 303. See 33 
U.S.C. § 1341(a), (d). The CACA conditions which require 
EnerProg to terminate use of the MEGS Pond by November 1, 
2018, dewater the pond by September 1, 2019, and cap the 
remaining coal combustion residuals by September 1, 2020, cannot 
be applied under section 401(d) independently of section 303 
10https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelroc/vol9/iss1/4
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because they do not concern water quality standards. This is 
evident in the statute, as the CACA does not designate the use of 
the navigable waters, nor does it set water quality criteria for such 
waters based upon such uses. Instead, CACA is a state-enacted law 
that requires assessment closure, and remediation of substandard 
coal ash disposal facilities in the State of Progress in order to 
prevent public hazards. Hence, these state law requirements are 
not appropriate because they are not based on achieving water 
quality standards as established under CWA section 303, and is 
thus beyond the scope of section 401(d). 
 
II. THE APRIL 25, 2017, TEMPORARY STAY 
NOTICE EFFECTIVELY POSTPONES THE 
NOVEMBER 1, 2018, DEADLINES FOR 
ACHIEVING ZERO DISCHARGE OF COAL ASH 
TRANSPORT WATERS FOR THE 2015 ELGS 
RULE BECAUSE IT IS A LAWFUL AND 
REASONABLE EXERCISE OF THE EPA’S 
DISCRETION UNDER SECTION 705 OF THE 
APA. 
 
APA section 705, broadly authorizes an agency to “postpone 
the effective date of action taken by it, pending judicial review,” 
where the agency finds that “justice so requires.” 5 U.S.C. 705 
(2012). The April 25, 2017, Temporary Stay Notice is a valid and 
reasonable exercise of EPA’s authority under the APA because it 
comports with section 705, compliance dates are within the 
meaning of “effective date,” and notice and comment is not 
required when issuing a section 705 temporary stay. This Court 
reviews EPA’s decision on the deferential arbitrary and capricious 
standard. Sierra Club v. Jackson, 833 F. Supp. 2d 11, 18 (D.C.C. 
2012). 
 
A. The Temporary Stay Notice Comports with APA 
Section 705 Because EPA Reasonably Concluded 
that Justice So Requires the Postponement of 
Certain 2015 ELGs Rule Compliance Deadlines in 
Light of Pending Judicial Review in the Fifth 
Circuit. 
11
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APA section 705, imposes only two conditions on an agency’s 
authority to stay the effectiveness of a rule: (1) the agency must 
find that “justice so requires;” and (2) the rule stayed must be 
“pending judicial review.” 5 U.S.C. § 705. Here, EPA Administrator 
Scott Pruitt did not violate section 705 in issuing the April 25, 
2017, Temporary Stay Notice of certain compliance deadlines in 
the final 2015 ELGs Rule because the statute places broad 
authority on EPA to provide equitable relief pending judicial 
review when it finds that justice so requires. Id. 
On April 25, 2017, EPA published the Temporary Stay Notice1 
reasoning that pursuant to APA section 705 justice so requires it 
to postpone certain not yet effective compliance dates of the 2015 
ELGs Rule to preserve the status quo while litigation is pending. 
Postponement of Certain Compliance Dates for Effluent 
Limitations Guidelines and Standards for the Steam Electric 
Power Generating Point Source Category, 82 Fed. Reg. 19,005 
(Apr. 25, 2017) (temporary stay notice). Particularly, the 
Temporary Stay Notice postpones compliance deadlines for 
achieving zero discharge of fly ash and bottom ash transport water. 
Id. 
 
1. EPA reasonably concluded that “justice so requires” a stay 
of compliance deadlines. 
 
Section 705 does not impose any specific standard for issuance 
of administrative stays, other than when “justice so requires” it. 5 
U.S.C. § 705. Because section 705 does not specify 
what factors an agency must consider in determining whether 
“justice so requires” a stay, EPA is free to follow its own; and 
“absent extraordinary circumstances, it is improper for a reviewing 
court to prescribe the procedural format an agency must follow.” 
Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 
U.S. 519, 541 (1978). This is because “[b]eyond the APA’s minimum 
requirements, courts lack authority to impose upon [an] agency its 
                                                          
1 The April 25, 2017, Temporary Stay Notice is being challenged in the U.S. District 
Court for the District of Columbia. Complaint, Clean Water Action, et al. v. Pruitt, No. 17-
817 (D.D.C. May 3, 2017), ECF Doc. No. 1. 
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own notion of which procedures are best.” Perez v. Mortg. Bankers 
Ass’n, 135 S.Ct. 1199, 1207 (2015). 
Despite section 705’s clear language, one district court held 
that the standard for a section 705 stay at the agency level is “the 
same as the standard for a stay at the judicial level: each is 
governed by the four-part preliminary injunction test.” Sierra 
Club, 833 F. Supp. 2d at 29–30; see also 5 U.S.C. § 705 (courts may 
only grant stays under section 705 to prevent irreparable injury). 
However, because the Sierra Club v. Jackson court’s interpretation 
is neither binding nor consistent with the plain language of section 
705, EPA’s section 705 reasonable determination should be 
reviewed under the appropriate “justice so requires” standard. See 
S. Shrimp All. v. United States, 33 Ct. Int’l Trade 560, 572 (2009). 
In light of the broad authority expressly delegated to the EPA 
in section 705, the EPA reasonably determined that based on the 
circumstances justice required staying the approaching 
compliance deadlines. In the Temporary Stay Notice the EPA 
explained that the administrative petitions for reconsideration 
raises “sweeping and wide ranging” objections to the 2015 ELGs 
Rule that overlap with issues in the litigation. 82 Fed. Reg. at 
19,005. EPA emphasized that the petitions raised issues relating 
to the feasibility and costs of the new limits. Id. EPA reasonably 
determined that—in light of the “capital expenditures that 
facilities incurring costs under the [2015 ELGs] Rule will need to 
undertake” to meet the fast approaching compliance deadlines and 
EPA’s reconsideration of the 2015 ELGs Rule—justice so requires 
it to postpone the compliance dates of the rule that have not yet 
passed. Id.; see also Effluent Limitations Guidelines and 
Standards for the Steam Electric Power Generating Point Source 
80 Fed. Reg. 67,838, 67,854 (Nov. 3, 2015) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 
423) (2015 final ELGs rule). 
 
2. The 2015 ELGs Rule is pending judicial review in the Fifth 
Circuit.  
 
Under section 705, an agency may only postpone an action 
taken by it that is pending judicial review. 5 U.S.C. § 705. 
Following EPA’s promulgation of the 2015 ELGs Rule, numerous 
parties filed petitions for review of the rule, which were 
13
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consolidated in the Fifth Circuit. Consolidation Order, Sw. Elec. 
Power Co. v. EPA, No. 15–60821 (5th Cir. Dec. 9, 2015), Doc. No. 2. 
Here, the EPA rightfully issued the Temporary Stay Notice 
under section 705 because it stayed certain compliance deadlines 
of the 2015 ELGs Rule that are “pending judicial review.” As the 
EPA explained in the Temporary Stay Notice, the “sweeping and 
wide-ranging objections” raised in the reconsideration petitions 
overlap with issues in the Fifth Circuit litigation. 82 Fed. Reg. at 
19,005. On April 12, 2017, when EPA announced it would 
reconsider the 2015 ELGs Rule, it faced an impending May 4, 2017, 
deadline to file its merits brief. Id. Thereafter, EPA moved to hold 
the case pending in the Fifth Circuit in abeyance for 120 days and 
the Fifth Circuit granted EPA’s motion. Abeyance Order, Sw. Elec. 
Power Co. v. EPA, No. 15–60821(5th Cir. Apr. 24, 2017), Doc. No. 
00513964356; see also 82 Fed. Reg. at 19,005–06. Thus, EPA 
clearly articulated a link between the pending judicial review and 
the stay of certain 2015 ELGs Rule compliance deadlines since the 
pending judicial challenges underlie both the reconsideration and 
the stay. 
 
B. Section 705 Authorizes the Postponement of Future 
Compliance Dates Because they are Within the 
Meaning of the Term “Effective Date.” 
 
Section 705 broadly authorizes EPA to postpone the “effective 
date of action taken by it.” 135 U.S.C. § 705. The EPA reasonably 
construed section 705 to permit it to stay specific compliance dates 
that fall after the initial effective date of the 2015 ELGs Rule. 
Specifically, EPA reasonably concluded that compliance dates that 
have not passed are within the meaning of “effective date.” The 
Supreme Court in United States v. Mead Corp., noted that agency 
action, whatever its form, is due some deference given the 
“specialized experience and broader investigations and 
information” available to the agency. 533 U.S. 218, 234 (2001) 
(citing Skidmore v. Swift Co., 323 U.S. 134, 139 (1944)). Thus, 
because EPA’s determination that compliance deadlines fit within 
“effective date” involve the interplay of the APA, CWA, and the 
2015 ELGs Rule, EPA is owed deference. 
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The view that EPA is without authority to postpone certain 
deadlines of the 2015 ELGs Rule because the January 4, 2016, 
effective date has already passed relies on an overly restrictive 
interpretation of “effective date.” Under section 705, EPA may stay 
“the effective date of action taken by it.” 5 U.S.C. § 705. The term 
“effective date” is not defined in the APA and therefore must be 
viewed in context. The APA defines “agency action” broadly as “the 
whole or a part” of any agency rule, order, license, or sanction, 
relief, or the equivalent or denial thereof, or the failure to act,” Id. 
§ 551(13); see also id. § 701(b)(2). Thus, it is reasonable to read 
effective date to include multiple dates because an agency action 
may have more than one part. 
Here, the 2015 ELGs Rule established an effective date of 
January 4, 2016, but the earliest compliance dates take effect 
November 1, 2018. 80 Fed. Reg. at 67,838, 67,894–97; see 40 C.F.R. 
§ 423.13(g)(1)(i), (h)(1)(i), (i)(1)(i), (k)(1)(i) (2017). EPA’s 
interpretation gives full effect to the APA’s definition of “agency 
action” and allows an agency to postpone part of a rule by 
postponing certain future compliance dates. The EPA’s 
interpretation also gives meaning to “justice so requires” as it 
allows the EPA to narrowly tailor its postponement to only the 
particular future compliance dates that may cause hardship. 
Also, neither case law nor prior agency practice precludes the 
EPA’s interpretation of including compliance dates within the 
meaning of “effective date.” EPA has never interpreted section 705 
to not authorize the agency to postpone compliance dates of a rule 
whose effective date has already passed. Although a lower court 
recently addressed this issue, the opinion is unpublished and the 
facts are highly distinguishable. See Becerra v. U.S. Dep’t of 
Interior, No. 17-cv-02376-EDL, 2017 WL 3891678, at *8–11 (N.D. 
Cal. Aug. 30, 2017). 
The court in Becerra v. U.S. Department of Interior relied on 
another unpublished decision, Safety-Kleen Corp. v. EPA, to hold 
that the term “effective date” in section 705 did not encompass 
“compliance dates.” Id. However, the lower court’s reliance on 
Safety-Kleen Corp. was unjustified given that it does not address if 
the meaning of “effective date” includes compliance dates that have 
not yet passed. See Safety-Kleen Corp. v. EPA, No. 92-1629, 1996 
U.S. App. LEXIS 2324, at *2–*3 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 19, 1996). Most 
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importantly in Becerra the Department of the Interior tried to 
postpone the entire rule based on the fact that some compliance 
dates had not yet passed. Becerra, 2017 WL 3891678, at *8–9. In 
our case, the EPA is not staying the entire 2015 ELGs Rule, but is 
merely postponing certain compliance dates that have yet to 
become effective. It was thus reasonable for the EPA to conclude 
that because the compliance deadlines reflect the dates when 
specific parts of the 2015 ELGs Rule take effect, they fit perfectly 
within the meaning of “effective date.” 
 
C. The EPA May Postpone the Compliance Dates of a 
Rule Under APA Section 705 Without Notice and 
Comment Rulemaking Because Section 705 Does Not 
Require Notice and Comment and an Agency Issued 
Stay is Not a “Rule.” 
 
Section 705 is a free-standing grant of authority to provide 
equitable relief pending judicial review that does not mention or 
cross-reference the APA’s separate rulemaking provisions. The 
APA has numerous cross-references, indicating that Congress 
chose to intentionally include them when it so wanted to. See, e.g., 
5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (2012) (cross-referencing sections 556 and 557); 5 
U.S.C. § 556(a) (2012) (cross-referencing sections 553 and 554); 5 
U.S.C. § 706(2)(E) (cross-referencing sections 556 and 557). Courts 
are reluctant to read additional requirements into a statutory 
provision when there is no indication in the text or legislative 
history that Congress intended to incorporate those terms. See, 
e.g., Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2140 (2016) 
(rejecting dissent’s interpretation of statute because “[i]t reads into 
the provision a limitation . . . that the language nowhere 
mentions”). The fact that Congress did not cross-reference section 
553 shows that it did not intend for section 705 to require notice 
and comment rulemaking. 
Additionally, the EPA is not required to undertake notice and 
comment rulemaking when issuing a section 705 stay of not yet 
effective compliance deadlines because the stay is not a “rule” 
within the meaning of APA section 553. Under the APA, a “rule” is 
an “agency statement . . . designed to implement, interpret, or 
prescribe law or policy.” 5 U.S.C. § 551(4). The Temporary Stay 
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Notice does none of these things, and is therefore not a rule. A court 
recently addressed this issue and held that a section 705 stay “does 
not constitute a substantive rulemaking because, by definition, it 
is not ‘designed to implement, interpret, or prescribe law or 
policy[.]’” Sierra Club, 833 F. Supp. 2d at 28 (citations omitted). 
Nor does the Temporary Stay Notice repeal or amend the 2015 
ELGs Rule. See 5 U.S.C. § 551(5) (“‘[R]ule making’ means agency 
process for formulating, amending, or repealing a rule.”). The 
Temporary Stay Notice has not altered the substance of the 2015 
ELGs Rule. 
Some courts have recognized that when an agency puts off 
compliance indefinitely, such a suspension is “tantamount to a 
revocation” and should be subject to the same notice and comment 
requirements as a repeal under the APA. See Nat. Res. Def. 
Council, Inc. v. EPA, 683 F.2d 752, 763 (3d Cir. 1982); Pub. Citizen 
v. Steed, 733 F.2d 93, 98 (D.C. Cir. 1984). However, section 705 
stays are temporary procedural tools employed by agencies to 
preserve the status quo pending judicial review. 
Lastly, interpreting section 705 to require notice and comment 
defeats the policy behind section 705 since the upcoming deadlines 
that the agency intends to postpone will likely have passed. 
Clearly, an agency cannot undergo notice and comment 
rulemaking within the limited time between a final rule’s 
publication and initial effective date. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(d). 
Therefore, the EPA did not act arbitrarily or capriciously in issuing 
the Temporary Stay Notice postponing certain compliance 
deadlines under the 2015 ELGs Rule. 
In sum, because the Temporary Stay Notice postponing the 
2015 ELGs Rule’s compliance deadlines for achieving zero 
discharge of coal ash waters is a valid and reasonable exercise of 
EPA’s authority under section 705, it has the effect of relieving 
EnerProg from complying with the November 1, 2018, deadlines 
for achieving zero discharge of fly ash and bottom ash transport 
water. See 82 Fed. Reg. at 19,005; see infra Section III. 
 
III. EPA REGION XII’S RELIANCE ON BPJ FOR 
REQUIRING ZERO DISCHARGE OF COAL ASH 
TRANSPORT WATERS IS UNJUSTIFIED 
17
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BECAUSE AS A MATTER OF LAW THE 2015 
ELGS RULE APPLIES. 
 
CWA section 301(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a) (2012), prohibits the 
discharge of pollutants to “waters of the United States” unless 
authorized by, among other things, an NPDES permit. EPA 
implements the federal NPDES program by issuing permits that 
allow for the discharge of pollutants subject to limitations. 33 
U.S.C. § 1342 (2012). Here, EPA Region XII’s reliance on BPJ was 
unjustified given that the 2015 ELGs Rule has the full force and 
effect of law. This Court reviews EPA’s action under the arbitrary 
and capricious standard. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). 
 
A. The CWA Does Not Require Case-by-Case BPJ 
Limits Where a Final Nationwide ELG Applies. 
 
The plain language of the CWA does not allow permitting 
authorities to perform a BPJ analysis when applicable ELGs are 
in place. Effluent limitations in NPDES permits may be either 
technology-based (“TBELs”) or water quality-based. See 33 U.S.C. 
§§ 1311(b), 1313, 1342. If the EPA has developed industrial 
category-wide ELGs such limits must be included in that facility’s 
permit. Id. § 1342; 40 C.F.R. § 125.3(c)(1) (2017). However, where 
the EPA has not developed an ELG for a particular industry, or 
has not addressed a particular pollutant discharged by an 
industry, the CWA authorizes EPA to use its BPJ to develop permit 
limits based on case-by-case analysis. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a)(1)(B); 40 
C.F.R. § 125.3(c)(2)–(c)(3). Thus, the imposition of BPJ is required 
only “[i]f no national standards have been promulgated for a 
particular category of point sources.” Natural Res. Def. Council, 
Inc. v. EPA, 859 F.2d 156, 199 (D.C. Cir. 1988). 
Here, EPA Region XII was required to include in EnerProg’s 
January 18, 2017, issued NPDES Permit only the 2015 ELGs 
Rule’s limits, pursuant to section 402(a) of the CWA, 33 U.S.C. 
§ 1342, and 40 C.F.R. § 125.3(c)(1). The ELGs for the Steam 
Electric Power Generating Point Source Category are codified in 
40 C.F.R. § 423. On November 3, 2015, EPA properly promulgated 
the final 2015 ELGs Rule entitled, “Effluent Limitations 
Guidelines and Standards for the Steam Electric Power 
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Generating Point Source Category,” thereby amending 40 C.F.R. § 
423. See 80 Fed. Reg. at 67,839. The EPA determined in the 2015 
ELGs Rule that power plants are able to meet a zero-discharge 
standard for fly ash and bottom ash wastewaters based on the 
available technology of dry handling of these wastes. See id. at 
67,841. The 2015 ELGs Rule applies to EnerProg’s NPDES Permit 
because the MEGS is a coal fired steam electric power plant with 
one unit rated at a maximum dependable capacity of 745 
megawatts. See 40 C.F.R. § 423.10. Thus, the 2015 ELGs Rule 
applied to EnerProg’s MEGS wastewaters. 
Moreover, although the 2015 ELGs Rule is currently being 
challenged in the Fifth Circuit and EPA announced that it will 
conduct a new rulemaking to revise portions of the 2015 ELGs 
Rule, it is still a final rule because it has not been vacated or 
remanded. See 82 Fed. Reg. at 19,005; Abeyance Order, Sw. Elec. 
Power Co. v. EPA, No. 15–60821(5th Cir. Apr. 24, 2017), Doc. No. 
00513964356. EPA has held that it must issue permits based on 
effluent regulations promulgated in final form pursuant to CWA 
sections 301 and 304, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311, 1314, even when those 
regulations are undergoing judicial review. See In re Inland Steel 
Co., 1975 WL 23870, at *4 (E.P.A.G.C.); In re U.S. Steel Corp., 1975 
WL 23847, at *1 (E.P.A.G.C.); In re U.S. Steel Corp., 1975 WL 
23866, at *3 (E.P.A.G.C.); In re Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co., 
1975 WL 23875, at *1 (E.P.A.G.C.). The fact here remains that the 
2015 ELGs Rule is a properly promulgated rule with the full force 
and effect of law. See 80 Fed. Reg. at 67,839. Accordingly, as a 
matter of law, the EPA should have issued EnerProg’s NPDES 
Permit based on the current 2015 ELGs Rule. 
 
B. EPA Region XII’s Unjustified Reliance on BPJ Has a 
Negative Practical Effect on EnerProg’s NPDES 
Permit Requirements. 
 
Because the April 25, 2017, Temporary Stay Notice effectively 
postpones the November 1, 2018, compliance deadlines for 
achieving zero discharge limits of coal ash transport waters, it has 
the effect of relieving EnerProg from complying with the November 
1, 2018, deadlines for achieving zero discharge of fly ash and 
bottom ash transport water. See 82 Fed. Reg. at 19,005. The EPA 
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also announced a proposed rule to postpone the compliance date 
for the more stringent BAT effluent limitations for fly ash and 
bottom ash transport water which would thereby relieve EnerProg 
from compliance. Postponement of Certain Compliance Dates for 
the Effluent Limitations Guidelines and Standards for the Steam 
Electric Power Generating Point Source Category, 82 Fed. Reg. 
26,017 (proposed June 6, 2017) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 423).  
Also, the 2015 ELGs Rule is currently being challenged in the 
Fifth Circuit so there is a possibility that it may be vacated or 
modified. EPA’s policy for revision of issued NPDES permits 
following a modification is as follows: only those permit conditions 
and limitations based upon promulgated effluent guidelines which 
were subsequently modified as the result of a court order or 
remand may be revised pursuant to this policy. In re U.S. Steel 
Corp., 1975 WL 23847, at *3. Here, if the 2015 ELGs Rule is 
modified as the result of a court order, EnerProg will be unable to 
request a revision of its NPDES Permit because the permit 
requirements are based on BPJ and not the 2015 ELGs Rule. 
Therefore, EPA Region XII’s reliance on BPJ to support the zero 
discharge limits requirement for bottom ash and fly ash transport 
waters negatively impacts the practical effect on EnerProg’s 
NPDES Permit. 
 
C. Even if the 2015 ELGs Rule Was Eliminated or 
Vacated, Reliance on BPJ is Unjustified Because the 
1982 ELGs Apply. 
 
Where a current rule has been invalid, the prior agency rule 
will control “until validly rescinded or replaced.” Cumberland Med. 
Ctr. v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 781 F.2d 536, 538 (6th Cir. 
1986). Thus, assuming the 2015 ELGs Rule was eliminated or 
vacated, the 1982 ELGs control since it has the full force and effect 
of law. Steam Electric Power Generating Point Source Category 
Effluent Limitations Guidelines, Pretreatment Standards and 
New Source Performance Standards, 47 Fed. Reg. 52,290 (Nov. 19, 
1982) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 423) (1982 final rule). 
 
1. The 1982 ELGs regulate arsenic, mercury, and selenium. 
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Here too the plain language of the CWA state that EPA is not 
to perform a BPJ analysis when applicable ELGs are in place. 33 
U.S.C. § 1342. Only where EPA has not developed an ELG for a 
particular industry, or has not addressed a particular pollutant 
discharged by an industry, is the EPA authorized to use its BPJ to 
develop permit limits based on case-by-case determinations. See 40 
C.F.R. § 125.3(c)(2)–(c)(3). 
Here, the 1982 ELGs regulate arsenic, mercury, and selenium 
and therefore EPA Region XII should have applied the 1982 ELGs 
as required by the CWA. There are only two published court 
opinions directly addressing this issue and both held that the 1982 
ELGs regulate arsenic, mercury, and selenium and therefore the 
1982 ELGs applied. See Louisville Gas & Elec. Co. v. Kentucky 
Waterways All., 517 S.W.3d 479, 492 (Ky. 2017); Nat. Res. Def. 
Council v. Pollution Control Bd., 37 N.E.3d 407, 413 (Ill. App. Ct. 
2015). When developing the 1982 ELGs the EPA declined to impose 
BAT based limits on thirty-four metals and toxins and explained 
that they were “excluded . . . because they are present in amounts 
too small to be effectively reduced by technologies known to the 
Administrator.” 47 Fed. Reg. at 52,303–04. Both courts reasoned 
that although the 1982 ELGs do not provide a TBEL for the thirty-
four toxic chemicals it lists— including mercury, arsenic, and 
selenium—the lack of a TBEL for that pollutant does not mean 
that the unregulated pollutant was unaddressed by or is outside 
the scope of the 1982 ELGs. See 37 N.E.3d 407, 413; 517 S.W.3d 
479, 488–89. 
Additionally, both courts found support for their holding under 
the NPDES Permit Writer’s Manual (“Permit Manual”). See 
Louisville Gas & Elec. Co., 517 S.W.3d at 489 (approving and 
discussing Pollution Control Bd.); Pollution Control Bd., 37 N.E.3d 
at 413–14. The Permit Manual states that case-by-case TBELs are 
established only in situations where ELGs are inapplicable, such 
as: 
 
When [ELGs] are available for the industry category, but no effluent 
guidelines requirements are available for the pollutant of concern . . . . The 
permit writer should make sure that the pollutant of concern is not already 
controlled by the effluent guidelines and was not considered by EPA when 
the Agency developed the effluent guidelines. 
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U.S. EPA, National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System 
(NPDES) Permit Writers’ Manual, § 5.2.3.2, at 5-45 to 5-46 (Sept. 
2010). Thus, both courts concluded that because the EPA 
considered and addressed arsenic, mercury, and selenium when 
creating the 1982 ELGs, the permit writer was required “to refrain 
from imposing [BPJ] limitations” and must instead apply the 1982 
ELGs. See Louisville Gas & Elec. Co., 517 S.W.3d at 489; Pollution 
Control Bd., 37 N.E.3d at 414. Therefore, because arsenic, 
mercury, and selenium are regulated under the 1982 ELGs, EPA 
Region XII’s decision to set BPJ limits was arbitrary and 
capricious. 
 
2. Assuming BPJ is justified, EPA Region XII failed to 
consider whether the BAT effluent limitation was 
economically achievable. 
 
The EPA does not have unlimited discretion to establish 
permit effluent limitations when issuing permits on a case-by-case 
basis using its BPJ. EPA Regions are required to consider the 
factors enumerated in section 304 of the CWA, 33 U.S.C. § 1314(b). 
See also 40 C.F.R. § 125.3(c)–(d). In addition, courts reviewing 
permits issued on a BPJ basis hold EPA to the same technology-
based standard and factors that must be considered in establishing 
the national ELGs. See Trustees for Alaska v. EPA, 749 F.2d 549, 
553 (9th Cir. 1984) (reasoning EPA must consider statutorily 
enumerated factors in its BPJ determination of effluent 
limitations). For existing sources, toxic pollutants are subject to 
BAT. See 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311(b)(2), 1314(b)(2), 1317(a)(2). “[T]he 
basic requirement for BAT effluent limitations is only that they be 
technologically and economically achievable.” Am. Petroleum Inst. 
v. EPA, 858 F.2d 261, 265– 66 (5th Cir. 1988). A technology is 
“available” even if it is used only by the best facility in the industry. 
See Chem. Mfrs. Ass’n v. EPA, 870 F.2d 177, 226 (5th Cir. 1989). A 
technology is economically achievable if the costs can be reasonably 
borne by the industry as a whole. See Waterkeeper All., Inc. v. EPA, 
399 F.3d 486, 516 (2d Cir. 2005); Rybachek v. EPA, 904 F.2d 1276, 
1290-91 (9th Cir. 1990). 
Arsenic, mercury, and selenium are toxic pollutants and thus, 
assuming BPJ reliance is justified, EPA Region XII was required 
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to determine what effluent limitations represent BAT level using 
its BPJ by considering all the factors. See 40 C.F.R. § 125.3(c)-(d). 
Here, EPA Region XII determined, in its BPJ, that zero discharge 
of coal ash handling wastes by November 1, 2018, constitutes BAT 
for discharges associated with fly ash and bottom ash transport 
wastes. The EPA properly determined that the BAT effluent 
limitation was technologically achievable because dry handling of 
bottom ash and fly ash has been in use at existing industry plants. 
However, the EPA wrongly determined that the BAT effluent 
limitation was economically achievable because it failed to consider 
if the costs can be reasonably borne by the industry as a whole. The 
EPA only determined that the MEGS is sufficiently profitable to 
adopt dry handling of bottom ash and fly ash because it “would cost 
no more than twelve cents per month increase in the average 
consumer’s electric bill.” EPA should have considered what the 
costs would be to the industry as a whole, not what the cost 
increase would be to the consumer. 
Although Congress intended BAT to be technology-forcing an 
agency determination is rejected as arbitrary and capricious if it 
fails to consider appropriate factors. See St. Elizabeth Cmty. Hosp. 
v. Heckler, 745 F.2d 587 (9th Cir. 1984). Therefore, because EPA 
Region XII acted arbitrary and capricious in determining that zero 
discharge of fly ash and bottom ash transport wastes by November 
1, 2018, constituted BAT for discharges associated with waste, this 
Court should reject EPA’s Region XII’s determination. 
 
IV. OUTFALL 008 IS NOT A DISCHARGE SUBJECT 
TO NPDES PERMITTING REQUIREMENTS 
BECAUSE THE MEGS POND IS NOT A WATER 
OF THE UNITED STATES AND IS OUTSIDE THE 
JURISDICTIONAL REACH OF THE CWA. 
 
The CWA prohibits the discharge of any pollutant from a point 
source into “waters of the United States,” unless authorized by, 
among other things, an NPDES permit. 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a). 
Congress explicitly limited the jurisdiction of the CWA to “waters 
of the United States.” Id. § 1362(7) (2012); Rapanos v. United 
States, 547 U.S. 715, 756 (2006). Importantly, the CWA does not 
apply to all waters within the United States, and certain bodies of 
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water have been specifically excluded from the CWA’s 
jurisdictional reach. See 40 C.F.R. § 122.2 (defining “waters of the 
United States”); see also Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook Cty. v. U.S. 
Army Corps of Eng’rs, 531 U.S. 159 (2001) (holding that CWA 
jurisdiction does not apply to isolated ponds that are not adjacent 
to open water). These excluded bodies of water are not subject to 
the requirements of the CWA, including the NPDES permitting 
requirements. 33 U.S.C. § 1342. 
EPA Region XII and the EAB properly determined that the 
MEGS Pond is not a “water of the United States” as defined in 40 
C.F.R. § 122.2, specifically under the exclusion for “waste 
treatment systems” and incorporation of Note 1. Accordingly, 
discharges from internal Outfalls 008 and 009 into the MEGS Pond 
are not subject to the NDPES permitting requirements. Once 
again, this Court reviews EPA’s action under the extremely 
deferential arbitrary and capricious standard. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). 
 
A. The Internal Discharges into the MEGS Pond are 
Exempted from NPDES Requirements Because the 
MEGS Pond is a Waste Treatment Pond and Not a 
Water of the United States. 
 
The MEGS Pond is outside the jurisdictional reach of the CWA 
and exempt from NPDES permitting requirements because it is 
excluded from EPA’s definition for “waters of the United States.” 
The MEGS Pond is a “waste treatment system . . . designed to meet 
the requirements of the CWA” and is therefore not a water of the 
United States. 40 C.F.R. § 122.2. This exclusion applies even 
though the MEGS Pond was originally created by impounding a 
water of the United States because the EPA properly suspended 
the sentence which limited the exclusion by including Note 1 in 40 
C.F.R. § 122.2. 
 
1. The EPA has authority to define “waters of the United 
States” for purposes of administering the CWA. 
 
An administrative agency has the authority to form policy and 
promulgate rules “to fill any gap left, implicitly or explicitly, by 
Congress” when administering a congressionally created program. 
24https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelroc/vol9/iss1/4
  
2018] RUNNER UP – BEST BRIEF 129 
 
Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 231 (1974). “Such legislative 
regulations are given controlling weight unless they are arbitrary, 
capricious, or manifestly contrary to statute.” Chevron, U.S.A. Inc., 
467 U.S. at 844. 
Congress drafted the CWA to prohibit the discharge of any 
pollutant from a point source into “navigable waters.” 33 U.S.C. 
1311(a). “Navigable waters,” is statutorily defined as the “waters 
of the United States.” Id. § 1362(7); Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 730–31. 
For purposes of administering the CWA and issuing permits, 
including NPDES permits, EPA promulgated a regulatory 
definition defining the scope of “waters of the United States.” See 
33 U.S.C. § 1342(a)(1); 40 C.F.R. § 122.1. The regulatory definition 
for waters of the United States includes, among other things, “all 
impoundments of waters otherwise identified as waters of the 
United States.” 40 C.F.R.§ 122.2(a)(4). However, the regulatory 
definition for “waters of the United States” also explicitly excludes 
“waste treatment systems, including ponds . . ., designed to meet 
the requirements of the [CWA].” Id. §122.2(b)(1). 
 
2. The MEGS Pond is excluded from the regulatory definition 
of waters of the United States because it is a “waste 
treatment system . . . designed to meet the requirements of 
the [CWA].” 
 
EnerProg does not contest that Fossil Creek and the MEGS 
Pond fall within the scope of EPA’s definition for “waters of the 
United States” pursuant to 40 C.F.R. § 122.2. Fossil Creek is a 
perennial tributary of a navigable in-fact interstate body of water, 
the Progress River, and is a “water of the United States” within the 
jurisdictional reach of the CWA. 40 C.F.R. § 122.2(a)(2), (a)(5). The 
MEGS Pond is an impoundment of Fossil Creek, a water of the 
United States, and thereby fits within the definition of a “water of 
the United States” for impoundments. Id. § 122.2(a)(4). However, 
the MEGS Pond qualifies as “a waste treatment system, including 
treatment ponds . . . designed to meet the requirements of the 
CWA.” 40 C.F.R. § 122.2(b)(1). 
EnerProg acknowledges that the waste treatment system 
exclusion was initially limited to “only manmade bodies of water 
which neither were originally created in waters of the United 
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States nor resulted from the impoundment of waters of the United 
States.” 40 C.F.R. § 122.2(b)(1); Hazardous Waste and 
Consolidated Permit Regulations, 45 Fed. Reg. 33,066, 33,424 
(May 19, 1980). However, following the adoption of the regulation, 
regulated parties in the industry filed petitions for review which 
prompted the EPA to suspend and re-examine the provision. 
Consolidated Permit Regulations, 45 Fed. Reg. 48,620 (July 21, 
1980) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 122.2, Note 1). Specifically, EPA 
suspended the qualifying sentence of the exclusion, amending 40 
C.F.R. § 122.2 to include Note 1 which states: “[i]n 40 C.F.R. 
§ [122.2], in the definition of ‘Waters of the United States,’ the last 
sentence, beginning ‘This exclusion applies. . .,’ is suspended until 
further notice.” Id. Note 1 effectively suspends the qualification to 
the exclusion, providing that all “waste treatment systems, 
including treatment ponds . . . designed to meet the requirements 
of the [CWA]” are not waters of the United States. 40 C.F.R. 
§ 122.2(b)(1). 
 
3. The EPA intended for the waste treatment system exclusion 
to supersede the classification of a water as an 
impoundment. 
 
The classification of the MEGS Pond as a “waste treatment 
system” supersedes its classification as “an impoundment” of a 
water of the United States. Subsection (b) of the EPA’s regulatory 
definition for “waters of the United States” exempts specific water 
bodies and water features, “even where they otherwise meet the 
terms of [an impoundment of waters of the United States].” 40 
C.F.R. § 122.2(b). 
EPA’s interpretation of the exclusion and the Note 1 
suspension are “the ultimate criterion” when determining the 
meaning of an agency’s regulation “unless it is plainly erroneous 
or inconsistent.” Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 
410, 414 (1945). The court “must give substantial deference to an 
agency’s interpretation of its own regulations.” Thomas Jefferson 
Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 512 (1994). “Unless an alternative 
reading is compelled by the regulation’s plain language or by other 
indications of the [Administrator’s] intent at the time of the 
regulation’s promulgation,” the court must defer to the EPA’s 
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interpretation. Gardebring v. Jenkins, 485 U.S. 415, 430 (1988). 
Such deference is warranted when the regulation concerns “a 
complex and highly technical regulatory program.” Thomas 
Jefferson, 512 U.S. at 512 (citing Pauley v. BethEnergy Mines, Inc., 
501 U.S. 680, 697 (1991)). 
Here, EPA clearly interprets the waste water treatment 
exclusion to apply even if the “treatment pond” is an 
“impoundment.” As discussed above, the EPA intentionally 
suspended the limiting language of the waste water exclusion 
because it created too many problems with pre-existing waste 
treatment systems. The subsequent publications and amendments 
of EPA’s regulatory definitions manifest the EPA’s intent to 
exclude impoundments like the MEGS Pond when the 
impoundment qualifies for the exclusion under 40 C.F.R. 
§ 122.2(b). 
The Clean Water Rule: Definition of Waters of the United 
States, 80 Fed. Reg. 37,054 (June 29, 2015) (codified at 40 C.F.R. 
pt. 122.2) (“Final Rule”) is the most recent publication of 40 C.F.R. 
§ 122.2. The Final Rule expressly states: “[w]aters and features 
that are excluded under paragraph (b) of the rule cannot be 
determined to be jurisdictional under any of the categories in the 
rule under paragraph (a).” 80 Fed. Reg. at 37,073. Additionally, 
EPA specifically states: “[i]mportantly, under the rule all waters 
and features identified in paragraph as excluded will not be 
“Waters of the United States” even if they otherwise fall within one 
of the categories in paragraphs (a)(4) through (a)(8).” Id. at 37,096. 
(emphasis added). Paragraph (a)(4) identifies “all impoundments 
of waters of the United States as falling within the jurisdiction of 
the CWA. See 40 C.F.R. § 122.2(a)(4). 
Additionally, Note 1 has been included in all subsequent 
publications of 40 C.F.R. § 122.2, specifically the: 1983 
Amendments to section 122.2 (Environmental Permit Regulations: 
RCRA Hazardous Waste; SDWA Underground Injection Control); 
the CWA National Pollution Discharge Elimination System; CWA 
section 404 Dredge or Fill Programs; and CAA Prevention of 
Significant Deterioration, 48 Fed. Reg. 14,146 (Apr. 1, 1983) 
(codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 122.2), and the recent amendments to 
“waters of the United States” in 2015, 80 Fed. Reg. at 37,054. The 
EPA’s consistent and longstanding practice to include Note 1, 
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suspending the qualification limiting the waste treatment system 
exclusion, in all subsequent publications of 40 C.F.R. § 122.2 
further demonstrates EPA’s intent to exclude waste treatment 
systems even when the pond is created from an impoundment of a 
water of the United States. 
Furthermore, there is no evidence that EPA included this 
explanation as a post-hoc rationalization just for “the purpose of 
litigation.” Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 212 
(1988). Rather, the explanation makes it clear that the EPA 
purposely intended to exclude impoundments specifically designed 
to be a waste treatment system, like the MEGS Pond, from the 
jurisdictional reach of the CWA. 
 
B. EPA’s Suspension of the Limitation on the Waste 
Treatment Exclusion is Effective Because the EPA 
Adhered to the Requirements for Administrative 
Rulemaking Pursuant to Section 553 of the CWA. 
 
Petitioner FCW claims that the suspension of the last sentence 
of paragraph (b)(1) of 40 C.F.R. § 122.2, Note 1, originally 
published in 45 Fed. Reg. 48,620, and retained in the most recent 
amendment to the code section is invalid because it does not 
comply with the statutory requirements of section 553 of the APA. 
See 45 Fed. Reg. at 48,620. Section 553 establishes “the maximum 
procedural requirements which Congress was willing to have 
courts impose upon agencies in conducting rulemaking 
procedures.” Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp., 435 U.S. at 524. 
Section 553 expressly requires a federal agency to provide 
public notice and an opportunity to comment whenever an agency 
proposes, amends, or repeals a rule. 5 U.S.C. § 553(c). It also 
provides that “[g]eneral notice of the proposed rulemaking shall be 
published in the Federal Register.” Id. § 553(b). The notice 
requirements are intended to “assure fairness and mature 
consideration of rules.” NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 394 U.S. 759, 
763 (1969). “Section 553(b) does not require that interested parties 
be provided precise notice of each aspect of the regulations 
eventually adopted. Rather, notice is sufficient if it affords 
interested parties a reasonable opportunity to participate in the 
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rulemaking process.” Forester v. Consumer Product Safety 
Comm’n., 559 F.2d 774, 787 (D.C. Cir. 1977). 
Petitioner FCW’s claim is not supported as evidenced by EPA’s 
actions. Note 1 was promptly published in the Federal Register 
when the suspension was first issued by EPA in 1980. See 45 Fed. 
Reg. at 48,620. Since the initial publication, the EPA included the 
suspension in two amendments to 40 C.F.R. § 122.2, the 1983 
Amendments to section 122.2, 48 Fed. Reg. at 14,146, and the 2014 
proposed rulemaking to amend section 122.2, Definition of “Waters 
of the United States” Under Clean Water Act, 79 Fed. Reg. 22,187 
(proposed Apr. 21, 2014) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 122.2). In 
both rulemakings, EPA followed the notice and comment 
requirements of section 553 by including the notice of the proposed 
amendments in the Federal Registrar and allowing interested 
parties the opportunity to comment on the potential impacts of the 
proposed amendments to the rule. The suspension is therefore 
compliant with section 553 of the APA and effectively excludes the 
MEGS Pond from CWA jurisdiction. 
 
C. Alternatively, the EPA’s Suspension of the 
Limitation on the Waste Treatment Exclusion is a 
Policy Judgment Not Subject to the Requirements of 
APA Section 553. 
 
On the other hand, if this court finds that the EPA did not 
adhere to the requirements of APA section 553, this court should 
dismiss FCW’s claims because the inclusion of Note 1 and 
suspension of the limiting language of the “waste treatment 
system” exclusion is not a rulemaking as defined by the APA. 
Rather, the inclusion of Note 1 and suspension of the limiting 
language of “waste treatment system” constitutes a policy 
judgment by the EPA Administrator. Statements of policy are 
specifically excluded from the 553 requirements. 5 U.S.C. 
§ 553(b)(3)(A). 
While section 553 generally requires notice and an opportunity 
to comment for an agency’s proposed rulemaking, it also contains 
an exemption for “interpretative rules, general statements of 
policy, or rules of agency organization, procedure, or practice.” Id. 
“Policy statements are exempt from the APA’s notice-and-comment 
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requirements, and thus may take effect without the rigors and 
presumed advantages of that process.” Bechtel v. F.C.C., 10 F.3d 
875, 878 (D.C. Cir. 1993). 
A rule is a policy statement if the statement “merely guide[s] 
future exercise of agency discretion by advising agency officials, 
staff, and the public in a manner in which the agency intends to 
exercise a discretionary power.” Brown Express, Inc. v. United 
States, 607 F.2d 695, 701 (5th Cir. 1979). If the policy statement 
leaves “agency decision-makers free to exercise discretion” then the 
policy statement is distinguishable from a substantive rule. Am. 
Bus Ass’n. v. United States, 627 F.2d 525, 529 (D.C. Cir. 1980). 
Additionally, a policy statement “is one that does not impose any 
rights and obligations on [a regulated party].” Texaco, Inc. v. Fed. 
Power Comm’n., 412 F.2d 740, 744 (3d. Cir. 1969). 
Here, the EPA’s suspension of the qualifying limitation to the 
“waste treatment system” exclusion found in Note 1 fits the 
description of a policy statement. The suspension still allows for 
discretion to determine whether a water body qualifies as a waste 
treatment system. In fact, the suspension actually expands EPA’s 
discretion by removing the limitation because the suspension 
permits EPA to determine whether any impoundment qualifies for 
the waste treatment system exclusion, rather than just 
impoundments that are “man-made.” 
Moreover, the suspension does not create an obligation or right 
to a regulated party. Suspending the limitation on the waste 
treatment exclusion does not provide EnerProg an exclusion by 
right. Whether EnerProg’s internal discharges into the MEGS 
Pond are excluded from the NPDES permitting requirements is 
still a decision left to EPA’s discretion. 
 
V. THE CLOSURE AND CAPPING OF THE MEGS 
POND DOES NOT REQUIRE A DREDGE AND 
FILL PERMIT PURSUANT TO SECTION 404 OF 
THE CWA BECAUSE THE MEGS POND DOES 
NOT INVOLVE A “WATER OF THE UNITED 
STATES.” 
 
The Clean Water Act prohibits the discharge of any pollutant, 
including dirt, rock, clay and other materials into the “waters of 
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the United States, except as authorized by section 404, 33 U.S.C 
§ 1344. See 31 U.S.C. § 1311(a), The Secretary of the Army is 
charged with issuing permits for “the discharge of dredged or fill 
material” into the jurisdictional waters of the United States at 
“specified disposal sites.” Id. § 1344(a), (d). 
FCW asserts that dewatering and capping of the MEGS Pond 
requires a fill permit pursuant to section 404 of the CWA. However, 
because the MEGS Pond is not a “water of the United States,” any 
discharge of fill material into the MEGS pond is not subject to the 
section 404-permitting scheme. Accordingly, section 404 of the 
CWA does not apply to the closure and capping of the MEGS Pond. 
 
A. The MEGS Pond is not a “Water of the United States” 
Under the Regulatory Definitions Implemented by 
the EPA and the Army Corps of Engineers. 
 
A water body must be within the jurisdictional reach of the 
CWA for its statutory requirements to apply. For section 404 of the 
CWA, jurisdiction is satisfied if the discharge of dredged or fill 
materials is discharged into “navigable waters.” 33 U.S.C. 
§ 1344(a); Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook Cty, 531 U.S. at 162. 
“Navigable waters” is defined under the CWA as “the waters of the 
United States, including the territorial seas.” 33 U.S.C. §§ 1344(a), 
1362(7). 
“The statutory term ‘waters of the United States’ is sufficiently 
ambiguous to constitute an implied delegation of authority to the 
Corps.” United States v. Deaton, 332 F.3d 698, (4th Cir. 2003). 
However, both EPA and the Corps of Engineers have developed 
nearly identical regulatory definitions of “waters of the United 
States” for purposes of implementing permits. Both regulatory 
definitions for “waters of the United States” include 
“impoundments” of jurisdictional waters, such as the MEGS Pond. 
Compare 40 C.F.R. § 232.2 (EPA’s definition for “waters of the 
United States”), with 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a)(4) (2017) (Corps of 
Engineers definition of “waters of the United States”). 
Both agencies also have identical exclusions for “waste 
treatment systems” that define waste treatment systems as “not 
waters of the United States.” Compare 40 C.F.R. § 232.2 (EPA’s 
definition states “waste treatment systems, including treatment 
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ponds . . . designed to meet the requirements of the Act . . . are not 
waters of the United States.”), with 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(b)(1) (Corps 
of Engineers definition states “waste treatment systems, including 
treatment ponds . . . designed to meet the requirements of the 
[CWA].”). Most importantly, both EPA and the Army Corps share 
the view that a designation as a “waste treatment system” 
supersedes a designation as an “impoundment.” Compare 40 
C.F.R. § 232.2 (EPA notes “[Waste treatment systems] are not 
“waters of the United States” even where they otherwise meet the 
terms of [an impoundment] of this definition.”), with 33 C.F.R. 
§ 328.3(b) (Corps of Engineers note “[Waste treatment systems] 
are not ‘waters of the United States’ even where they otherwise 
meet the terms of [an impoundment].”). 
As previously stated, EnerProg does not contest that the 
MEGS Pond is an impoundment of Fossil Creek, a water of the 
United States. However, the MEGS Pond is a waste treatment 
system designed to meet the requirements of the CWA. The MEGS 
Pond sole function is to collect ash transport water for 
sedimentation treatment in order to meet the effluent limitations 
placed on Outfall 002, which directly discharges into the Moutard 
Reservoir. Therefore, the Corps of Engineers and EPA properly 
used their discretion to determine that the MEGS Pond is a waste 
treatment system designed to meet the requirements of the CWA 
and properly excluded it from section 404 requirements. 
 
B. EPA is Not the Proper Authority to Issue a Section 
404 Fill Permit. 
 
Even if a fill permit is required, the Army Corps of 
Engineers—not the EPA—possesses the authority to issue section 
404 fill permits under the CWA. Section 404 assigns “the Secretary 
of the Army, acting through the Chief of Engineers” the 
responsibility of administering and issuing permits for the 
discharge of fill materials. 33 U.S.C. § 1344(a), (d). Additionally, 
section 402 “prohibits the EPA from exercising permitting 
authority that is provided [to the Corps] in section 404.” Couer 
Alaska, Inc. v. Se. Alaska Conservation Council, 557 U.S. 261, 273 
(2009). Both EPA and the Army Corps of Engineers share the view 
that section 402 “prohibits the EPA from issuing permits for 
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discharges that are regulated under section 404.” Id. at 274; see 
also 40 C.F.R. § 122.3(b); Water Pollution Control Memorandum of 
Agreement on Solid Waste, 51 Fed. Reg. 8,871 (March 14, 1986) 
(Memorandum of Agreement between EPA and the Corps to 
address the applicability and overlap of 402 and 404 permit 
programs). Once again, the agencies’ interpretation should be 
granted deference unless it is “plainly erroneous or inconsistent 
with the regulation.” Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997). 
In Couer Alaska, the Supreme Court affirmed the EPA and the 
Corps of Engineers interpretation of the section 402 and 404 
interplay. 557 U.S. at 272–76. The Supreme Court found that 
EPA’s authority over section 404 permits is limited to providing 
“guidelines” and the “power to veto a permit.” Id. at 274. The Court 
found that the EPA’s authority to issue “guidelines” permitted the 
EPA to write rules to help determine “whether to permit a 
discharge or a fill.” Id. However, “those guidelines do not strip the 
Corps of Engineers of power to issue permits for fill cases.” Id. at 
276. Under the “veto” power, the EPA may object to a disposal site 
if use of the defined area causes “an unacceptable adverse effect on 
municipal water supplies, shellfish beds and fishery areas . . . , 
wildlife, or recreational areas.” Id.; see also 33 U.S.C. § 1344(c). 
Regardless which role the EPA takes, the Supreme Court in Couer 
Alaska made it clear “[i]f the Corps has authority to issue a permit, 
then the EPA may not do so.” Id. at 275. 
In the matter at hand, should EnerProg require a section 404 
permit for the closure and capping of the MEGS Pond, the Army 
Corps is the appropriate agency to issue the permit. As discussed 
supra, if the EPA chooses to exercise its authority regarding the 
closure and capping of the MEGS Pond, it may do so by 
conditioning the dewatering of the MEGS Pond via the NPDES 
Permit for Outfall 002. However, the EPA is limited to its advisory 
role and veto power when the discharge of fill material is subject 
to the Corps authority under section 404. 
Since the EPA did not raised any issues with the disposal site 
and/or recognized any potential impacts the closure and capping of 
the MEGS Pond may have to municipal water supplies, shellfish 
beds, fisheries, wildlife, or recreation, the EPA’s involvement is 
limited to providing guidance to the Army Corps of Engineers to 
ensure compliance with the CWA. The EPA has done so by 
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promulgating the regulations and guidelines found in Parts 230-32 
of Title 40 in the Code of Federal Regulation. See 40 C.F.R. § 230.1 
(2017) (“Congress has expressed a number of policies in the [CWA]. 
These Guidelines are intended to be consistent with and to 
implement those policies.”). However, the EPA is not the proper 
authority to determine whether the dewatering and capping of the 
MEGS pond requires a fill permit pursuant to section 404 of the 
CWA as such discretion belongs to the Army Corps of Engineers. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
For the reasons stated above, EnerProg respectfully requests 
that this Court remand NPDES permit PG000123 to EPA Region 
XII for further consideration and additionally find that: (1) 
inclusion of State of Progress’ conditions requiring coal ash pond 
closure and capping were improper because they don’t comply with 
section 401(d); (2) the April 25, 2017 Temporary Stay Notice 
effectively postpones the 2015 ELGs Rule’s November 1, 2018, 
compliance deadlines for achieving zero discharge coal ash 
transport waters, thereby also postponing EnerProg’s NPDES 
permit deadlines; (3) EPA Region XII could not rely on BPJ limits 
as a ground for requiring zero discharge of coal ash transport 
waters; (4) EPA Region XII properly excluded Internal Outfall 008 
from NPDES permitting requirements; and (5) EPA Region XII 
properly determined that the coal ash pond closure and capping 
plan does not require a permit under section 404 of the CWA. 
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